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Cognition always occurs in some context. When children (or adults) 
have performed in a particular setting before or have dealt previously 
with the materials or ~nformation pertinent to the task at band, levels 
of performance are typically higher than when the context is less 
familiar. Fischer ( 1980), in bis theory of cognitive development, mad;l 
much of this fact, postulating that children function at their optimal J 
level (which is set by maturation) only when the environment is 
maximal! su ortive. - -
This dependency upon context is central .. to issues in the develop-
ment of children's strategies. Children dis y high levels of perfor-
mance and apparently use sophisticated strategies, but only under 
specific conditions. The environment must be supportive to the ex-
tent that it provides prompts or cues for children to use a particular 
strategy or to the extent that task-.relevant information is weil known 
to the children, presumably permitting them to process that informa-
tion efficiently. When children are presented with similar tasks with-
out prompts or involving less familiar information, task performance 
and strategy use decline (see Bjorklund & Muir, 1988). 
One of the major factors in the development of strategies, we 
believe, is children's acquisition of knowledge. Children are universal 
novices (Brown & DeLoache, 1978), knowing relatively little about 
most of the things they encounter. With age and experience they 
develop expertise in certain areas; but development of knowledge is 
rarely uniform across domains, and children find themselves with 
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more pockets of ignorance than of expertise. As a result, when strat-
egies are used effectively, they are typically limited to specific knowl-
edge-defined contexts, rarely generalizing to other situations in which 
they could be useful. 
Although knowledge can be defined very broadly, in this chapter 
unless otherwise stated, we define content knowledge in terms of 
information in a modified network model of semantic memory (see 
Bjorklund, 1987). Each item in semantic memory is defined by a node 
that is connected to other nodes in semantic memory. In addition to 
connections with other items, each node also has associated with it 
features that characterize it. In development, the number of nodes 
changes, as do the number and strength of connections among items. 
Also, the number of features associated with an item changes de-
velopmentally, as does the feature hierarchy (i.e., the priority given to 
various features associated with an item, cf., Gibson, 1971). When 
referring to a "domain" of knowledge, we refer to semantic knowl-
edge that is highly interrelated, such as a knowledge of the game of 
chess, the mies of soccer, or the composition of one's school dass. 
Strategies and their development can best be understood when one 
considers the domain of knowledge to which a strategy is applied. 
Of course, we do not mean to imply that all there is to development 
is the acquisition of knowledge. Rather, knowledge represents a cen-
ter stage around which both more elementary and specific and more 
complex and global processes revolve. Factors that influence the 
encoding of stimuli, the selective attention to relevant features of 
events, and the ease with which information can be represented in 
memory all affect the state of a person's knowledge. Similarly, one's 
knowledge base will influence (and will be influenced by) effortful 
strategies and metastrategies for operating on information. The 
effects on performance of developmental differences in the knowl-
edge base cannot in and of themselves adequately explain age differ-
ences in thinking; however, we believe that an understanding of 
developmental differences in the knowledge base and their effects on 
cognition are central to understanding strategy development, and 
cognitive development generally. 
DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN KNOWLEDGE, 
MENTAL EFFORT, AND STRATEGY USE 
The Relatlon Between Knowledge and Mental Effon 
There is little controversy in the statement that a child's knowledge of 
the world increases over the course of development. What is more 
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controversial is the assumption that these quantitative differences in 
content knowledge determine developmental differences in cognition 
(e.g., Carey, 1985). We do not make this strong claim here. We believe 
that many aspects of cognitive development are qualitative in nature 
(although the mechanisms underlying these qualitative changes may 
be quantitative). However, we also contend that quantitative changes 
in knowledge play a critical role in shaping children's cognitions, and 
many of the differences found on a wide range of cognitive tasks 
between children of different ages can be attributed to diff erences in 
their knowledge bases (see Bjorklund, 1989; Carey, 1985; Chi, 1985). 
With respect to the development of strategies, having detailed 
knowledge for a particular domain permits a person to process in-
formation from that domain more efficiently, with knowledge (and 
processing efficiency) increasing developmentally (e.g., Bjorklund, 
1985, 1987; Bjorklund & Hamishfeger, 1989, 1990; Muir-Broaddus 
& Bjorklund, in press). Basically, similar to Case (1985), we propose 
that cognitive resources are limited, with children becoming more 
eff ective in allocating their limited pool of resources for the execution 
of cognitive operations with age. 
One aspect of information processing that involves a portion of 
these shared, mental resources is the activation (or identification) of 
the information. When children are highly familiar with the items on 
a cognitive task or the relations among items, less in the way of mental 
resources is required to activate those items. By expending less of 
one's limited cognitive capacity for the activation of relevant task 
information, more resources can be allocated to the short-term stor-
age of information or to the execution of resource-expensive strat-
egies. Thus, as children's knowledge becomes more detailed and bet-
ter integrated, individual items and sets of related items can be ac-
cessed with reduced amounts of mental effort, affording more re-
sources for the execution of effortful strategies. 
Figure 4.1 presents a schematic representation of how having 
substantial knowledge for a particular domain may result in increased 
strategy use, and in turn, increased task performance. The primary 
effect that an elaborated knowledge base has on cognitive processing 
is to increase speed of processing for domain-specific information. 
Individual items can be accessed more quickly from the long-term 
store, as can relations among related items in the knowledge base. In 
the current model, faster processing is equated with more efficient 
processing, whicli results in greater availability of mental resources. 
These mental resources can then be applied to retrieving specific 
items (item-specific effects, Bjorklund, 1987; Muir-Broaddus & 
Bjorklund, in press}, to domain-specific strategies, or to metacogni-
tive processes. Domain-specifü: strategies can directly facilitate task 
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FIG 4.1. Model of the effects of knowledge on information processing and acquisition of 
subsequent knowledge. 
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performance, as can context-independent strategies, both of which 
can in turn affect subsequent metacognitive processes. This feedback 
loop between metacognitive processes and strategy use can take many 
forms. For example, in a free-recall task, children may begin to recall 
items according to categorical relations, with such clustering being 
guided primarily by strong interitem associations. In monitoring their 
recall, they may note some of these relations and more systematically 
guide their subsequent retrieval by this categorical scheme (see Bjork-
lund & Zeman, 1982). 
This, of course, represents merely a brief sketch of the relation 
between knowledge, mental effort, and strategy use. Having detailed 
knowledge can facilitate task performance in ways other than via 
strategies, but strategies are the emphasis of this chapter. Our point in 
the review that follows is to illustrate how developmental differences 
in knowledge play an important role in the development of strategies. 
Strategles as Effortful Processes 
In this chapter, strategies are defined as being effort consuming. 
They are goal directed in that they are not ends in themselves but 
deliberate means to an end, the end being enhanced task perfor-
mance. Strategies achieve cognitive pufpo;~and are potentially con-
scious and controllable activities (cf. Flavell, 1985). When tasks can be 
successfully completed without the use of strategies, there is no rea-
son to expect effortful operations to be used. Thus, when children 
can use relatively automatic and thus effortless processes to solve a 
problem, there is no need for the use of strategies. And when a 
process has been exercised so thoroughly that it is executed without 
conscious awareness, bringing the specific procedures involved in that 
operation to consciousness can actually impede cognition. Whether 
these formerly conscious and effortful but now unconscious and 
effortless procedures should be called strategies is certainly arguable 
(see Paris, Lipson, & Wixson, 1983; Schneider & Pressley, 1989). 
However, in the present context, we use the term strategy to refer to 
cognitive operations that are effortful and subject to consciousness. 
Strategies then, as defined here, are not necessary for all forms of 
complex cognition and may not always facilitate task performance, 
although this is the intent of using them. In fact, based on the 
assumption that the use of strategies requires large amounts of a 
child's limited mental resources, there should be situations where task 
performance will actually be hindered (or at least not greatly facili-
tated) by the use of a strategy. This occurs when the execution of the 
strategy depletes so much of a child's information-processing capacity 
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that too little remains for allocation to other aspects of the task. Older 
children and adults, by comparison, are able to take advantage of the 
greater efficiency that a strategy affords because they have sufficient 
mental resources available (e.g., Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1987; 
DeMarie-Dreblow & Miller, 1988; Guttentag, 1984; Kee & Howell, 
1988). 
Evidence of developmental changes in efficiency of strategy execu-
tion has been obtained in dual-task experiments, in which perfor-
mance on a secondary task (finger tapping, for example) is evaluated 
as a function of performance on a primary task (free recall, for 
example). Using dual-task paradigrns, there is evidence that when 
performance is equivalent across different age groups there may 
nevertheless be age-related differences in the mental resources con-
sumed by strategy implementation (e.g., Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 
1987; Guttentag, 1984; Kee & Davies, 1988; Kee & Howell, 1988; for 
a review of this work see Guttentag, 1989). Although we are confident 
that one of the reasons for these increases in efficiency with age is 
related to maturationally based changes in the speed with which 
information can be processed (e.g., Dempster, 1985; Kail, 1986, 
1988), we are equally confident that age-related differences in knowl-
edge also contribute significantly to this developmental change (e.g., 
Roth, 1983). 
The greater ef 1cieru:Y •. 'ifforded by a strategy must be weighed 
against the deple'tlon~:rtiiiiited resources required for the execution 
of that strategy. This trade-off has consequences that will vary with 
the age (and thus processing efficiency) of the child. In general, 
children can execute a strategy more efficiently with age (i.e., using 
less in the way of mental resources), making that strategy more likely 
to be beneficial to task performance. 
KNOWLEDGE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
STRATEGIES 
Evldence from Nonmemory Research 
A developmental relationship between knowledge, mental effort, and 
strategy use has been demonstrated for a broad range of tasks, includ-
ing mathematics, reading, and problem solving. 
Mathematlcs 
In the domain of mathematics, increases in strategy sophistication 
and factual and procedural knowledge act to increase processing 
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efficiency, and thereby decrease the mental eff ort requirements of 
mathematical operations. Although children as young as 5 and 6 
years demonstrate some fact retrieval, as shown by their fast perfor-
mance of simple operations with small whole numbers (e.g„ Hamann 
& Ashcraft, 1985), they quickly revert to overt strategies such as 
finger counting as problem difficulty increases (Siegler & Shrager, 
1984). For the most part, then, young children rely on simple but 
relatively effortful strategies, such as counting each element sepa-
rately in order to determine the total (Siegler, 1987). Another early 
strategy is the min procedure, which entails setting one's "mental 
counter" at the !arger of two numbers to be added, and then counting 
by increments of one until the second smaller number has been added 
to the first (Ashcraft & Fierman, 1982; Siegler, 1987). As predicted by 
the min model, reaction times are proportional to the size of the 
numbers being added (Groen & Parkman, 1972; Groen & Resnick, 
1977), attesting to the laborious nature of this early counting pro-
cedure. 
Although Ashcraft and Fierman ( 1982) found that the transitional 
stage between the min strategy and fact retrieval occurs around the 
third grade level, Siegler ( 1987) has provided evidence that as early as 
firs a~d second grade, children performed more fact retrieval and 
dec m~s on (transforming a problem into two or more simpler 
ones) than their kindergarten counterparts. Though decomposition is 
an effortful strategy, it has the effect of reducing the mental effort 
requirements of the necessary computations. Thus, with age, there is 
a gradual transition from the use of "labor-intensive" to "labor-
efficient" techniques, and from effortful (strategies) to automatic (fact 
retrieval) processes in the domain of arithmetic. As these processes 
become more efficient, moreover, their mental effort requirements 
are further lessened. 
Readlng 
The significance of mental effort has also been emphasized in 
the domain of reading. Following a model of mental resources simi-
lar to what we have ascribed (Case, 1985), Daneman and her col-
leagues have examined the interplay between the processing and 
storage functions of working memory in an attempt to understand 
developmental and individual differences in reading comprehen-
sion (e.g., Daneman & Blennerhassett, 1984; Daneman & Carpen-
ter, 1980; Daneman & Green, 1986). Basically, they proposed that it 
is necessary for information to be retained in working memory for 
as long as possible so that each newly read word in a passage can be 
integrated with the words and concepts that preceded it. Younger or 
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less proficient readers have less available capacity to store and main-
tain information in working memory because it is necessary for them 
to devote considerable capacity to the processes involved in com-
prehension (Daneman & Blennerhassett, 1984). These include any-
thing from letter decoding to concept integration. Alternately, young 
children also have fewer resources to devote to comprehension pro-
cesses because more capacity is consumed by storage and mainte-
nance functions. 
This trade-off between processing, storage, and comprehension 
was examined across a variety of age groups. For example, in a study 
of prereaders, Daneman and Blennerhassett (1984) provided con-
vincing evidence that listening span, defined as the number of suc-
cessive short sentences that could be recalled verbatim, correlated 
significantly with comprehension. The second experiment of this 
two-part study was especially convincing because of the systematic 
variations made in the level of integration required for comprehen-
sion. They reasoned that the greater the required level of integration, 
the greater the processing demands on working memory and thus the 
less capacity remaining for storage. As expected, the greater the 
required level of integration, the greater was the performance advan-
tage of large-span over small-span listeners in terms of comprehen-
sion. Daneman and her colleagues have arrived at similar in-
terpretations in experiments with older children and adults (e.g. , 
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Green, 1986). 
One factor believed to influence the efficiency of text processing is 
knowledge. Anderson and his colleagues (Anderson, Hiebert, Scott, 
& Wilkinson, 1984) defined reading as "a process in which informa-
tion from the text and the knowledge possessed by the readers act 
together to produce meaning" (p. 8). In other words, "reading is a 
constructive process" (p. 9), in which the background knowledge that 
one brings to a text interacts with its literal content to produce in-
ferences and interpretations of varying degrees of concordance with 
the author's intended purpose. Anderson et al. cited considerable 
evidence from the research literature to support these claims. In a 
study by Pearson, Hansen, and Gordon (1979), for example, second 
graders who were equated in reading skill were tested for their 
knowledge of spiders and then given a passage about spiders to read. 
The children who knew more about spiders at the outset were better 
at answering subsequent questions about the passage, especially those 
questions that involved reasoning. Instructional efforts aimed at in-
creasing background knowledge have also been found to enhance 
reading comprehension (e.g. , Hansen, 1981; Hansen & Pearson, 
1983; Omanson, Beck, Voss, & McKeown, 1984). In more recent 
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research, Schneider, Körkel, and Weinert (in press) compared the 
text comprehension of soccer expert with soccer novice third-, fifth-, 
and seventh-grade children on stories related to soccer. The soccer 
experts showed significantly greater comprehension, with perfor-
mance being unrelated to individual differences in intelligence. In 
other words, domain-specific knowledge was more important for 
comprehension than intelligence (see also Recht & Leslie, 1988; Walk-
er, 1987). Knowledge, then, clearly makes reading more accurate and 
meaningful. lt also makes reading less effortful, in that knowledge 
provides "ready made" inferences and interpretations to the reader. 
Problem Solvlng 
The relationship between knowledge, mental effort, and strategy 
use is also evident in the study of problem solving. Considerable 
research has explored the role of knowledge by comparing the pro-
blem-solving characteristics of experts and novices. One robust find-
ing has been that the two groups categorize problems differently (e.g., 
Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982), with 
novices tending to categorize problems by their surface f eatures and 
experts tending to categorize them by their underlying principles. A 
study comparing novices and experts in the domain of physics, for 
example, found that novices grouped the problems according to 
characteristics of the problem Statement, such as all those problems 
involving a certain object (such as a rotating disk), or containing 
certain physics-related keywords (such as "friction"). Experts, on the 
other hand, categorized problems according to their "deep struc-
ture," such ~s the relevance of Newton's second law (Chi et al., 1981). 
These differences between novices and experts have been interpreted 
as reflecting characteristics of the "problem schema" by which pro-
blems are encoded and represented (Chi & Greeno, 1987). For the 
expert, schemas include secondary procedural knowledge about the 
applicability of existing strategies to the specific demands of the 
problem, thereby enabling inferences about the problem (i.e., the 
relations among problem components) and its solution tobe drawn. 
In this way, strategies can be viewed as simply one component of a 
rich knowledge base. With experience, problem and solution become 
increasingly intertwined in a single problem schema, so that the 
activation of appropriate problem-solving strategies becomes in-
creasingly automatic. 
Knowledge, then, plays a considerable role in determining the 
mental effort requirements of a problem-solving task. Unlike experts, 
who can attack a problem armed with a well developed schema and 
pre-existing problem representation, the problem solving of novices 
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is carried out on line (Chi & Greeno, 1987). That is, solutions must be 
derived from the problem itself instead of being selected from an avail-
able schema, and resources are consumed in the ongoing process of 
developing a schema where none or next-to-none existed before. 
There is considerable evidence from research in nonmemory do-
mains of the interrelationships between knowledge, mental effort, 
and strategy use. Common themes that emerge from the domains of 
arithmetic, reading, and problem solving are that knowledge provides 
the necessary background information and context to appropriately 
and efficiently guide the comprehension of a passage or problem. lt 
also frees mental effort for the implementation of strategies appro-
priate for carrying out the task at hand. As these strategies become 
more efficient, more of one's mental capacity remains for higher level 
comprehension, increasingly complex strategies, and the acquisition 
of more detailed and integrated knowledge. 
Evldence from Memory Research 
Knowledge and the Development of Rehearsal Strategles 
Recent work by Ornstein, Naus, and their colleagues suggests that 
the much cited change in rehearsal style over childhood (from passive 
' to active, or cumulative, e.g., Ornstein, Naus, & Liberty, 1975) is 
attributed, in part, to changes in children's knowledge base. For 
example, Tarkin M · · in Ornstein & Naus, 
1985), compare t ·r rader 'overt rehearsal for two word lists that 
differed in mean ng n Ytiith meaningfulness defined in terms of 
1) the extent to which the words elicited associations. Large differences 
in spontaneous rehearsal were observed, in that fewer than two words 
were typically rehearsed together when the list was low in meaning-
fulness, whereas more than three words tended to be grouped 
together during rehearsal of the highly meaningful list. 
In related research, Zembar and Naus 1985) reported more so-
phisticated rehearsal or SlX versus third grade children when a 
standard set of words served as the stimulus list. However, differences 
in rehearsal style and recall were eliminated when the third graders 
were given a list of highly familiar words (e.g., slwe, doll) and the sixth 
graders were given a list of difficult, unfamiliar words (e.g., limpet, 
• galleon). In other research, soccer expert and novice college students 
were given lists of categorized words to rehearse and recall (cited in 
Ornstein & Naus .1985). One list consisted of soccer-related words, 
whereas a control list consisted of nonsoccer words. No group differ-
ences emerged for the control list; on the soccer list, however, experts 
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grouped together more items from each category during rehearsal 
than the novices, and subsequently showed superior recall. 
Findings such as these indicate a potent relationship between 
knowledge and strategy use. When subjects are familiar with the 
to-be-processed items, they are apt to use a more sophisticated re-
hearsal strategy that results in enhanced levels of performance. The 
experiments by Ornstein and N aus dearly indicate that patterns of 
strategy use can be manipulated by varying the materials with which 
subjects are presented. They also indicate that the age-related 
changes typically observed in children's rehearsal activities are in-
fluenced by similar developmental changes in knowledge. 
Knowledge and the Development 
of Organlzatlonal Strategles 
Perhaps the area of memory research that has contributed most to 
our understanding of the developmental relationship between knowl-
edge and strategy use concerns organization. There have been a 
number of studies in which children's familiarity for sets of related 
items has been manipulated, with investigators assessing levels of 
recall and strategy use (usually categorical clustering). Although 
several studies have examined children's tendencies to use taxonomid 
conceptual versus complementary schemes in memory tasks (e.g„ 
Bjorklund & Zaken-Greenberg, 1981; Lange &Jackson, 1974; Wor-
den, 1976), more recent studies have manipulated children's knowl-
edge of categorical relations in terms of category typicality (e.g„ Acker-
man, 1986; Bjorklund, 1988; Bjorklund & Bernholtz, 1986; Corsale 
& Ornstein, 1980; Rabinowitz, 1984, 1988). In general, the results of 
these studies indicate that children are more apt to use a strategy 
effectively when the stimulus items are highly representative (i.e„ 
typical) of their categories. 
Category Typicality and Children's Strategy Use. Research by 
Rabinowitz (1984, 1988) provides a good example of the relationship 
between category typicality and strategy use. In one experiment, 
second and fifth grade children were presented with sets of highly 
typical (e.g., cat, lwrse) or moderately typical (e.g„ fox, goat) category 
exemplars for free recall (Rabinowitz, 1984). Subjects in the category 
condition were told of the categorical nature of the list and instructed 
to remember the items by categories. Subjects in the standard condi-
tion were given conventional free-recall instructions. Rabinowitz re-
ported that differences in recall between the category and standard 
conditions were greater (in favor of the category condition) for the 
highly typical than the moderately typical list items. In other words, 
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subjeets were better able to take advantage of the eategorical in-
struetions to benefit recall for the highly typieal items. These findings 
were supported in a later experiment with adults (Rabinowitz, 1988), 
in whieh greater awareness of an instrueted organizational strategy 
and greater transfer of that strategy was demonstrated for items rated 
as high as opposed to medium or low in eategory typieality. In both of 
Rabinowitz's experiments, overall reeall was greater for the high than 
for the less typical items, as were the benefits of strategy use and 
transfer, clearly illustrating an interaetion between knowledge base 
and strategy use. 
In related researeh, Bjorklund and his eolleagues (Bjorklund, 
1988; Bjorklund & Buehanan, 1989) assessed ehildren's acquisition 
and generalization of an organizational strategy for sets of typieal and 
atypical items over repeated trials. As in previous research, levels of 
reeall and clustering were greater for the sets of typical than atypieal 
items, with age differenees being most apparent for the atypieal items. 
Children were also classified as using an organizational strategy on 
eaeh trial, separately for the typieal and atypieal items, using a pro-
cedure developed by Bjorklund and Bernholtz (1986). Children were 
classified as strategic if they had at least one long intraeategory duster 
(three words or more) and fast within-category interitem latencies 
(i.e., their mean within-eategory interitem latencies were fas,ter than 
their mean between-category interitem lateneies). 
The number of fourth and seventh grade ehildren classified as 
Strategie using this dual eriterion is shown for the typieal and atypieal 
items over trials in Table 4.1. As shown in the table, seventh graders 
were more apt to be classified as strategie than the fourth graders, 
T ABLE 4.1 Number and Percentage of Subjects Classified a~ 
Strategie by Grade, Typicality, and Trial 
Trial 
1 2 3 4 
Fourth Grade 
Typical 11 (32%) 10 (29%) 17 (50%) 22 (65%) 
Atypical 2 ( 6%) 10 (29%) 11 (32%) 18 (53%) 
Sevenlh Grade 
Typical 16 (50%) 25 (78%) 24 (75%) 29 (91 %) 
Atypical 7 (21 %) 18 (56%) 20 (63%) 24 (75%) 
Note. From "Acquiring a Mnemonic: Age and Category Knowledge Effects" by D. F. 
Bjorklund, 1988,Joumal of Experimental Child Psychology, 45, p. 80. Copyright 1988 by 
Academic Press. 
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ehildren were more apt to be classified as strategie for the typieal than 
for the atypieal items, and there was a drarnatie inerease in strategie 
classifieation over trials. As ean be seen from the table, most ehildren 
were not classified as strategie on the initial trial. This is especially 
apparent for the atypical items. However, the situation was sub-
stantially different by the fourth trial. Most seventh grade ehildren 
were classified as strategie for both the typieal and atypical items. In 
faet, every seventh grade ehild was classified as Strategie on Trial 4 for 
either the typical or atypical items. The pattern was similar although 
less pronouneed for the fourth graders, with 74% of these ehildren 
being classified as strategie for at least one set of items on the final 
trial. 
The findings of the Bjorklund (1988) study were bolstered by a 
training experiment by Bjorklund and Buehanan (1989), in whieh 
third, fifth, and seventh grade ehildren were trained to use an organi-
zational strategy on sets of either typieal or atypieal items (Experiment 
2). Following training, ehildren were given a seeond list of items on a 
generalization task, with half of the ehildren reeeiving eategory-
typieal items and half reeeiving eategory-atypical items. The training 
lists (typieal or atypical) were orthogonal to the generalization lists 
(typical or atypieal). As in the Bjorklund (1988) investigation, ehildren 
were classified as strategie using the dual eriterion of at least one long 
intraeategory duster and fast within-category lateneies. 
The results of training were impressive in that there were no grade 
differenees in the pereentage of ehildren classified as strategie for the 
typieal items by the final (third) training trial (88%, 94%, and 94% for 
the third, fifth, and seventh graders, respeetively). Grade differenees 
were apparent, however, for the atypical items (56%, 63%, and 91 % 
classified as strategie for eaeh grade, respeetively), although more 
than half of the third grade ehildren tested were classified as strategie 
for these items. In assessing generalization, it was found that ehildren 
at eaeh grade level showed higher levels of recall and clustering when 
they had been trained on the eategory-typieal items (cf. Rabinowitz, 
1988). Patterns of results were similar for the strategy-classification 
measure. Moreover, grade differenees in strategy classification on the 
generalization trials were limited to the atypical items. 
Bjorklund and Buehanan (1989) proposed that the greater salieney 
of the typical eategories, and the inereased ease of aeeessing one 
eategory member given another, resulted in higher levels of reeall 
relative to ehildren who reeeived training with sets of atypieal items. 
This heightened performanee may have provided ehildren with the 
opportunity to assess more intently the organizational mnemonie they 
were being taught, resulting in great~r ineulcation of the strategy 
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than found for children who were given the atypical lists. This, in 
turn, led to greater generalization. Bjorl<lund and Buchanan (1989) 
concluded that using highly typical items makes the training of a 
strategy easier and the generalization of that strategy more likely. 
"Children's earliest successful memory strategies begin with highly 
familiar information and so do successful training efforts" (p. 469). 
They also commented that, although children of all ages display 
greater levels of performance and strategy use with sets of typical as 
opposed to atypical items, younger children's strategy use is especially 
affected by the use of atypical items. "The less sophisticated children 
are with respect to strategy use, the more important knowledge base 
factors are to their performance" (p. 470). 
Associative Versus Categorical Relations. Other research has ex-
amined developmental diff erences in strategy use when list items can 
be related on the basis of both associative and categorical relations 
(e.g., Bjorl<lund & de Marchena, 1984; Bjorl<lund & Jacobs, 1985; 
Frankel & Rollins, 1982, 1985; Lange, 1973; Schneider, 1986). Asso-
ciative relations are believed to be formed prior in development to 
categorical relations (Bjorklund &Jacobs, 1984), with the activation of 
one item eliciting its associate in an automatic (i.e. , effortless) fashion. 
In one experiment by Schneider (1986), second and fourth grade 
children were given a sort/recall task, with categorizable pictures 
serving as stimuli. Four different types oflists were used that varied in 
degree of category and interitem relatedness (cf. Frankel & Rollins, 
1985 ). One list contained items that were highly related to the cate-
gory with high interitem associations among some of the items on the 
list (high related-high associated). A second list was composed of 
items highly related to the category but with low interitem associations 
(high related-low associated). A third list was composed of items that 
were weakly related to the category, although some were highly 
associated (low related-high associated), and a fourth !ist consisted of 
words low in both category relatedness and interitem associativity (low 
related-low associated). Examples from the category "animals" for 
each list type are shown in Table 4.2. 
In general, more clustering was found for the highly associated 
lists, and the fourth graders had higher levels of recall and clustering 
and sorted items according to categorical membership to a greater 
degree than the second graders. Most importantly, there was a strik-
ing age-by-list associativity interaction in the clustering data, such that 
low associativity especially penalized the younger children. There 
were also significant correlations between sorting at study, clustering, 
and recall, with particularly high correlations (all rs > .5) for the older 
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TABLE 4.2 Examples of ltems by List-Type 
High related-high associated list: 
High related-low associated list: 
Low related-high associated List: 
Low related-low associated list: 
dog, cat, pig, horse, cow, mouse 
tiger, elephant, cow, pig, bear, dog 
goat, deer, buffalo, hippopotamus, monkey, 
lamb 
beaver, rat, alligator, camel, squirrel, giraffe 
Note. From "The Role of Conceptual Knowledge and Metamemory in the Develop-
ment of Organizational Processes in Memory" by W. Schneider, 1986, Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 42, p. 222 . Copyright 1986 by Academic Press. 
children. Overall, what emerges from this study is a portrait of second 
graders who use organizational strategies much less than fourth grad-
ers. This is a qualified conclusion, however, in that younger children's 
use of the clustering strategy can be evoked when the categories 
contain higWy associated items. 
In a related experiment by Bjorklund and Jacobs (1985), children 
from Grades 3, 5, 7, and 9 were given categorized lists of words to 
recall that varied in the associative strength among items within a 
category. Within each five-item category, two pairs of items were high 
associates of each other (e.g., cat, dog and lion, tiger) . A fifth item (e.g., 
cow) was not strongly associated with any of the other list items. Thus, 
in remembering category items together, a subject could recall items 
contiguously that are high associates of one another (e.g. , dog, cat) , or 
could recall items that are related to one another strictly on the basis 
of category relationship (i.e„ not high associates, e.g„ dog, lion; cow, 
tiger). Lists of items were presented to subjects in one of three ways : 
randomly, blocked by categories with highly associated items sepa-
rated within the list (blocked), and blocked by categories with highly 
associated items presented contiguously (blocked associate). 
Patterns of recall and clustering varied with grade and presenta-
tion condition, with performance being greatest in the blocked-
associate condition and least in the random condition for all grades. 
More interesting than levels of recall, however, was the pattern of 
correlations between recall and clustering. Bjorklund and Jacobs 
argued, as have others (e.g„ Frankel & Rollins, 1985; Jablonski, 
1974), that high, positive correlations between recall and clustering 
are indicative of strategic functioning. These correlations, presented 
in Table 4.3, were significant for all grade levels for subjects in the 
blocked condition, indicating that the blocking manipulation resulted 
in the identification and use of an organizational strategy even by the 
youngest subjects tested here (8- to 9-year-olds). However, these cor-
relations were nonsignificant for the third, fifth , and seventh graders 
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T ABLE 4.3 Correlations Between Recall and Clustering by Grade 
and Condition: Experiment 1 
Condition 
Grade Random Blocl!ed Blocl!ed Associate 
Third .16 .45* .08 
Fifth .13 .56* -.04 
Seventh .32 .69* .28 
Ninth .59* .66* .51* 
* p < .05. 
Note 1. All df = 18. 
Note 2. From "Associative and Categorical Processes in Children's 
Memory: The Role of Automaticity in the Development of Organization 
in Free Recall by D. F. Bjorklund and J. W. Jacobs,Joumal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 1985, 39, p. 605. Copyright 1985 by Academic Press. 
Reprinted by permission. 
in both the random and blocked-associate conditions. Only for the 
ninth graders were the correlations between recall and clustering 
significant for these two conditions. Thus, despite the high levels of 
recall and clustering observed in the blocked-associate condition, the 
organization observed here for the third, fifth, and seventh graders 
was apparently mediated by the relatively effortless activation of 
associative relations, and not by strategic (i.e., deliberate) processes. 
A similar pattern of correlational results has been reported in a 
recent study by Hasselhorn (1989). Second and fourth grade children 
were presented with lists varying in categorical relatedness (high 
versus low) and associativity (high versus low) (cf. Schneider, 1986). 
In a free-recall condition, Hasselhorn reported nonsignificant cor-
relations between recall and clustering for both the high and low 
associated lists, and for the low categorical lists for both the second 
and fourth grade subjects. For the high categorical lists, the correla-
tion between recall and clustering was again low for the second 
graders (r = .08) but higher and approaching significance for the 
fourth graders (r = .30). Thus, using the relationship between cluster-
ing and recall as an indication of strategic processing, only the oldest 
children could be considered to be strategic, and this only for the high 
categorical lists. 
Knowledge and Organlzatlon at Output 
With respect to the development of organizational strategies, 
Bjorklund and bis colleagues have proposed that the organization 
that is initially seen in the recall of most young children is mediated 
not by a deliberately imposed strategy, but rather by the relatively 
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automatic activation of well established semantic memory relations. In 
the process of this associatively mediated retrieval, children may 
notice categorical relations in their recall, and may then proceed to 
use this fortuitously discovered organizational strategy to guide the 
remainder of their recall (Bjorklund, 1985, 1987; Bjorklund & 
Jacobs, 1985; Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982, 1983). 
Such a process was inferred in experiments by Bjorklund and 
Zeman (1982, 1983), who asked children to recall the members of 
their current school dass. Although levels of recall and clustering 
were high for children of all grades (first, third, and fifth) when asked 
to retrieve the well known names of their classmates, metamemory 
interviews indicated that few children at any grade were aware of 
using an organizational strategy. Moreover, examination of children's 
clustering for each half of recall indicated that many children appar-
ently switched organizational schemes in the course of recall. Bjork-
lund and Zeman concluded that few children began the class-recall 
task in a strategic (i.e„ deliberate) way. However, because of the 
associative nature of their recall, organizational schemes (e.g„ recall-
ing children by seating arrangements, sex) were discovered by some 
children and used to direct the remainder of their recall. Children 
who, during the metamemory interview, were able to profess accu-
rately a strategy they had used in recalling their classmates' names (as 
reflected by their clustering scores) had higher overall levels of recall 
and clustering than children who were unable to accurately profess a 
strategy. These data suggest that the use of a strategy does facilitate 
performance (although even the performance of the nonstrategic 
children was high in an absolute sense), with the strategy being "dis-
covered" because of the familiar (and highly associative) nature of the 
to-be-remembered material. 
More direct evidence for this position comes from an experiment 
by Bjorklund and Jacobs (1985), outlined briefly above. To reiterate 
the design, third, fifth, seventh, and ninth grade children were given 
categorized lists to recall consisting of items related on the basis of 
both categorical and associative relations (e.g„ dog, cat, cow, lion, tiger). 
Children's intracategory clusters of three words or more were ex-
amined as a function of whether these clusters were led by an associa-
tive pair (e.g., dog, cat, cow) or not (e.g„ dog, cow, cat) . In the random 
condition, where subjects were not biased by order of item presenta-
tion to recall words either by categories or by associates, a nonmono-
tonic developmental relationship was observed. As shown in Fig. 4.2, 
the proportion of category clusters led by a high associate peaked for 
the seventh and ninth grade children. These values were significantly 
lower for the younger children and for a group of adults (who were 
run in the random condition only). 
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FIG 4.2. Proportion of total number of intracategory word strings of 
length three, four, and five to those leading with a high-associative word 
pair by grade. Data from "Associative and Categorical Processes in Chil-
dren's Memory: The Role of Automaticity in the Development of Organ-
ization in Free Recall" by D. F. Bjorklund and J. W. Jacobs, Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 1985, 39, p. 613. Copyright 1985 by Aca-
demic Press. Reprinted by permission. 
Bjorklund andjacobs (1985) interpreted these results as reflecting 
the fact that the seventh and ninth grade children were making use of 
the high associative relations to instigate categorical recall. As a result 
of the relatively automatic activation of associative relations, pairs of 
categorically related items were retrieved contiguously. These older 
children then used these associatively retrieved pairs as prompts for 
other categorically related items. The proportion of category clusters 
led by associative pairs was less for the adults, presumably, because 
they were sufficiently Strategie so that they did not require high 
associativity to prompt categorical recall. In contrast, nonassociated 
category relations were not easily activated by the third and fif th 
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graders, making the associative prompts relatively ineffective in elicit-
ing subsequent clustering. 
What may cause children, who apparently begin the task in a 
nondeliberate manner, to begin to use an organizational strategy in 
the course of recall? Bjorklund and his colleagues suggested a process 
akin to Piaget's (1971) idea of reflective abstraction (Bjorklund, 1980, 
1985, 1987; Bjorklund & Jacobs, 1985; Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982). 
Preadolescent children have the ability to reflect upon the outcomes 
of their own cognitions. In the present context, children are able to 
examine the products of their recall efforts and, in the process, may 
recognize previously unnoticed relations among the recalled items. 
Reflective abstraction is a conscious and eff ortful process, although it 
is likely not planful, in that children do not enter a task with the idea 
of evaluating the products of their recent cognitions. However, be-
cause it is resource consuming, children are not likely to engage in 
reflective abstraction until other aspects of task processing can be 
executed efficiently. Accordingly, children's "discovery" of an organi-
zational strategy should be most apt to occur for sets of items that are 
well represented in their semantic memories, such as the names of 
their classmates and highly associated words. lt is primarily in this 
way, we believe, that deliberate and effective strategies are typically 
mediated in development. 
We must emphasize here that this picture of the acquisition of an 
organizational strategy is meant to describe the developmental pro-
gression for tasks where children are not biased to organize informa-
tion at time of presentation. For example, in sort/recall paradigms, 
where children are allowed (and sometimes required) to group items 
according to meaning prior to recall, there is clear evidence of 
spontaneous strategy use in preadolescent, and even preschool, chil-
dren (e.g., Bjorklund & de Marchena, 1984; Bjorklund & Zaken-
Greenberg, 1981; Kee & Bell, 1981; Schneider, 1986; Schneider, 
Borkowski, Kurtz, & Kerwin, 1986; Sodian, Schneider, & Perlmutter, 
1986). The discrepancy between these results and those reported 
when sorting prior to testing is not possible, can be attributed to 
differences in task difficulty. Sort/recall tasks are easier to handle for 
young children because children usually have sufficient time to en-
code the stimulus items, and the instructions often bias children to 
form meaningful groupings of items, which is not the case in most 
free-recall (nonsorting) experiments. In general, adequate encoding 
strategies (i.e., sorting according to categories) greatly facilitates sub-
sequent retrieval. 
Success in nonsorting free-recall tasks, on the other hand, heavily 
depends on the efficiency of the retrieval strategies. There is evidence 
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that young elementary school children's problems with semantic 
categorization tasks are due more to deficiencies in retrieval strategies 
than to deficiencies in encoding relevant information (cf. Ackerman, 
1985, 1987; Brainerd, 1985). lt is not surprising, then, that 
elementary school children seem able to spontaneously use organiza-
tional strategies during encoding in sort/recall tasks, but fail to em-
ploy organizational strategies at retrieval in free-recall tasks where 
sorting is not permitted. lt is only for the lauer type of task that 
spontaneous use of organizational strategies is rarely observed in 
preadolescent children. However, we should note that differences in 
the familiarity of the task materials also influences children's tenden-
cies to organize information at input in sort/recall tasks. Younger 
children require more obvious and strongly associated relations 
among items (e.g., Corsale & Ornstein, 1980; Schneider, 1986) or 
more explicit prompts from the experimenter (e.g., Bjorklund, Orn-
stein, & Haig, 1977) before displaying strategic organization. 
STRA TEGIES, THE KNOWLEDGE BASE, AND 
METAMEMORY 
So far, we have restricted our review to studies that examined the role 
of semantic knowledge on children's strategies. There are other 
aspects of knowledge that can affect strategies as weil. Since the early 
seventies, research on metamemory has explored the relevance of 
knowledge about memory for strategy use and performance in var-
ious tasks (see Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Flavell, 1985; Schneid-
er, 1985; Wellman, 1983, for reviews of the literature). 
In most taxonomies of metamemory, a distinction is made between 
dedarative and proce1:i'f.l knowledge components. The declarative 
component taps factuäl' nowledge about memory by using meta-
memory questionnaires or interview procedures. More specifically, 
declarative metamemory includes knowledge about mnemonic per-
sons, tasks, and strategies. The person category addresses the child's 
mnemonic self-concept, including ideas about his or her own memory 
strengths and weaknesses. Task variables include factors that make a 
memory task easier (e.g., familiarity with learning materials, high 
interitem associations). Finally, the strategies variable refers to ver-
balizable knowledge about encoding and retrieval strategies. 
Although measures of declarative metamemory are taken without 
concurrent memory assessment (independent measures), measures of 
procedural knowledge are collected simultaneously with t~~ measure-
ment of memory activity (concurrent measures). They ta}Ji ·f~reness 
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of ongoing processes (memory monitoring) and mostly consist of 
judgments or feelings about the ease or difficulty of remembering 
something. Examples of memory monitoring measures include per-
formance predictions and recall-readiness assessments. 
lt has been shown in numerous studies that both declarative and 
procedural metamemory components are developing rapidly during 
the elementary school years (see Schneider & Pressley, 1989). Al-
though this seems to be an interesting finding in its own right, the 
question crucial for most researchers in the field has been how and to 
what degree increases in metamemory influence children's strategy 
use and performance in memory tasks. 
lnterrelatlons Arnong Organlzatlonal Strategles, 
Sernantlc Knowledge, and Metamemory 
We have stated earlier in this chapter that most young children do not 
use organizational strategies spontaneously. Given that strategy use, 
as defined in this chapter, is principally conscious and intentional, the 
expectation is that strategy usage should covary with the ability to 
verbally describe and explain strategic behavior (i.e., declarative 
metamemory). Theoretically, all children applying an organizational 
strategy should also possess the relevant declarative strategy knowl-
edge, but not necessarily vice versa (cf. Wimmer & Tomquist, 1980). 
In the aforementioned study by Schneider (1986), this assumption 
was tested by assessing different aspects of children's declarative 
metamemory. Metamemory measures included an interview tapping 
general metamemory, an interview dealing with knowledge about 
organizational strategies, and a paired-comparison judgment task 
developed by Justice (1986) to assess children's judgments of strategy 
effectiveness. 
The data showed that the different components of metamemory 
were related to memory performance in fourth graders but not in 
second graders. Moreover, individual differences in task-related 
metamemory (i.e., knowledge about organizational strategies) were 
important predictors of strategy use and recall for the fourth-grade 
children. In contrast, second graders' task-related metamemory was 
not related to sorting at study or clustering during recall. These 
findings demonstrate that second graders are relatively unaware of 
the importance of organizational strategies for facilitating recall on 
sort/recall tasks, indicating that output organization (i.e., clustering 
during recall) is involuntarily guided by associations between items 
rather than by category grouping principles (cf. Bjorklund & Jacobs, 
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1985; Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982). Deliberate use of organizational 
strategies is typically not found in this age group. 
On the other hand, fourth graders seem to be in a transitional state 
concerning the flexible use of organizational strategies. About half of 
the sample of fourth graders in Schneider's (1986) study showed 
strategic behavior, and those children were also able to verbalize their 
knowledge about organizational strategies. The remaining subjects 
seemed to be unaware of task requirements. lt is important to note 
that the degree of interitem associativ1ty in the sort/recall lists also 
affected strategy use and recall of those children with high metamem-
ory scores. Apparently, these children are "transitional" concerning 
deliberate strategy use because they required salient learning materi-
als to capitalize on their declarative knowledge. lt appears, then, that 
the knowledge base and metamemory jointly contribute to the acqui-
sition of organizational strategies. 
Significant correlations between the use of organizational strategies 
and declarative metamemory are occasionally found for children 
even younger than those recruited by Schneider (1986). In our view, 
this may be due to the interplay between the knowledge base and 
declarative metamemory. That is, only rudimentary knowledge about 
the advantage of organizational strategies may be sufficient to elicit 
sorting in a sort/recall task, provided that the children are highly 
familiar with stimulus materials. Given these preconditions, even 
young children (i.e., preschoolers and kindergarteners) can behave 
strategically in tasks of this nature (cf. Fabricius & Hagen, 1984; Paris, 
Newman, & McVey, 1982; Sodian et al., 1986). 
However, in concluding that there can be correlational rela-
tionships between knowledge about the efficacy of organizational 
strategies and memory behaviors in young children, it must also be 
pointed out that samples of young children typically include very few 
subjects who know a lot about organizational strategies and their 
advantages. For example, a closer inspection of the Wimmer and 
Tornquist (1980) data shows that only three out of the 24 first grade 
children possessed adequate knowledge of organizational strategies 
and used semantic categorization. Sodian et al. ( 1986) obtained a 
statistically significant correlation (r = .37) among 6-year-olds be-
tween reported pref erence for sorting strategies and their use in a 
sort/recall task. However, perceptual sorting strategies were pre-
ferred over semantic organizational strategies overall, even though 
they are less eff ective in mediating performance for this age group 
(Schneider, Körkel, & Vogel, 1987). Instead, the positive correlation 
reflects the fact that the few subjects who reported a preference 
for semantic sorting in their metamemory interview also used this 
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strategy to a large extent. Taken together, the results of these 
studies indicate that most children between four and eight years of 
age do not know about the eff ectiveness of semantic organizational 
strategies. 
Retrleval Strategles, Knowledge Base, 
and Metamemory 
Although research on organizational strategies reveals that young 
children do not know much about these strategies and consequently 
rarely apply them spontaneously, it has been shown in several studies 
that young children do have a rudimentary knowledge of memory 
strategies (cf. Baker-Ward, Ornstein, & Holden, 1984; Fabricius & 
Cavalier, 1989; Fabricius & Hagen, 1984; Sodian et al., 1986). 
If young children possess a metacognitive understanding of the 
behaviors they display on memory tasks, this understanding should 
be clearer and more articulate the more natural a memory task is for 
the child. Even very young children (2-year-olds) are familiar with 
hide-and-seek tasks, and memory-for-location tasks have been suc-
cessfully used with children of that age (e.g., DeLoache, 1980). 
Among other purposes, these tasks have been employed to study the 
development of a particular type of retrieval strategy, namely, cueing 
strategies. Geis and Lange ( 1976) found that even 4-year-olds, when 
hiding pictures of people in houses, made spontaneous use of the fact 
that the houses were marked with pictures of objects that were seman-
tically related to the people's social roles (e.g., crown-king). Young 
children's use of cueing strategies seems tobe dependent, however, 
on the strength of the semantic association between cue and target 
items (cf. Ritter, 1978; Whittaker, McShane, & Dunn, 1985). Thus, it 
could be that young children's behavior in hide-and-seek tasks, where 
there are strong semantic relations between cues and hidden objects, 
reflects an automatic tendency to group pictures with related objects 
rather than a deliberate, truly Strategie attempt at remembering. 
One way to find out whether young children employ retrieval cues 
in a deliberate attempt to aid prospective retrieval is to investigate 
their metacognitive understanding of retrieval-cue utilization. Studies 
by Beal (1985) and Whittaker et al. (1985) reveal that 5- and 6-year-
olds are aware of some of the basic requirements for retrieval cues, 
such as that the cue should be associated with the target item, and that 
an encounter with the cue is necessary for retrieval to occur. Howev-
er, it is not clear from these studies if this knowledge is closely related 
to preschoolers' and kindergarteners' use of cueing strategies. 
In a more recent study (Schneider & Sodian, 1988), the rela-
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tionships among planful behaviors, metacognitive awareness of the 
functions of these behaviors, and memory performance were in-
vestigated in 4- and 6-year-old children. Using a memory task similar 
to that of Geis and Lange (1976), pictures of people were hidden in 
and retrieved from houses. Half of the houses were marked with a 
picture of an object that was conceptually related to one of the 
people's social roles, whereas the other half were marked with pic-
tures that were not related in a conventional way to the people. The 
question was whether and to what extent preschoolers and kindergar-
teners would make use of the semantic association between cues and 
targets, and whether the use of related cues would improve their 
performance on two memory tasks (relocating the hidden pictures 
and free recall). A task-related metamemory interview was also given 
to explore whether the use of retrieval cues was accompanied by an 
awareness of their function. 
Schneider and Sodian (1988) found significant correlations be-
tween metamemory and memory behavior (i.e., use of retrieval cues) 
and memory performance (i.e., relocating hidden objects and free 
recall). The results thus showed that even very young children's 
D planful behaviors in memory tasks are accompanied by some degree 
of conscious awareness of the usefulness of these behaviors. In-
tercorrelations among metamemory, memory behavior, and memory 
performance were generally substantial, a result rarely found for this 
age group. In addition to metamemory, semantic knowledge positive-
ly affected recall. When children created their own relationships 
between target items and unrelated cues, they were less successful in 
relocating the items than when they relied on pre-established seman-
tic relationships. Again, it appears that it is the interaction of the two 
knowledge components that leads to optimal performance. 
Strategles, Knowledge, and Metamemory 
In Text Processlng 
From a theoretical perspective, it seems particularly interesting to 
analyze interactions between the knowledge base and metamemory in 
complex cognitive activities such as text processing. There is plenty of 
evidence in the literature that metacognitive knowledge concerning 
text recall and comprehension develops rather late in childhood (Ba-
ker & Brown, 1984; Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983; 
Garner, 1987). The impact of older children's metacognitive knowl-
edge about text processing on text recall and comprehension has also 
been consistently demonstrated (Forrest-Pressley & Waller, 1984; 
Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Pressley, Forrest-Pressley, & Elliott-Faust, 
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1988). Similarly, strong effects of the knowledge base on text process-
ing have been frequently shown, particularly impressively in research 
using the expert-novice paradigm (cf. Chi & Ceci, 1987; Chiesi, 
Spilich, & Voss, 1979). However, research on the interaction of the 
knowledge base and metacognitive knowledge in determining text 
recall and comprehension is rare. 
In a first attempt to address this complicated issue, the research 
group at the Munich Max-Planck-Institute for Psychological Research 
conducted a series of developmental studies all dealing with the 
impact of soccer expertise and metacognitive knowledge on recall and 
comprehension of a story dealing with a soccer game (Hasselhorn & 
Körkel, 1986; Körkel, 1987; Schneider, Körkel, & Weinert, in press). 
Although the story was generally easy to understand even for novices, 
there were a few exceptions to this rule. That is, occasionally impor-
tant information was omitted that had to be inferred by the reader. 
Moreover, several contradictions were built into the text that could 
only be detected by careful reading. Although knowledge about soc-
cer was important in order to draw correct inferences, it was not 
always necessary to detect the contradictions in the text. The soccer 
experts and novices in these studies (mostly third, fifth, and seventh 
graders) were presented with an extensive battery of memory and 
metamemory measures. 
Interactions between metamemory and the knowledge base were 
analyzed separately for declarative and procedural metacognitive 
knowledge. The declarative metamemory questionnaire tapped gen-
eral metacognitive knowledge not restricted to a specific domain. 
Thus, the expectation was that the soccer experts and novices would 
not differ on this measure. However, if individual differences in 
metacognitive knowledge are indeed important for text recall, this 
should be evident in within-group comparisons. Accordingly, the 
assumption was that in both the soccer expert and novice groups, 
children with high metacognitive knowledge should outperform 
those with low metacognitive knowledge. 
As can be seen from Fig. 4.3, the empirical findings confirmed this 
prediction. Recall was greater for the experts than the novices overall. 
In both the expert and novice groups, furthermore, children with 
high metacognitive knowledge recalled significantly more text units 
than their metacognitively unknowledgeable counterparts. Again, 
this result demonstrates that it is the combination of a rieb knowledge 
base and high metacognitive knowledge that leads to optimal per-
formance. 
The expectations concerning the relationship between the knowl-
edge base and procedural metacognitive knowledge differed from 
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FIG 4.3. Mean text recall (percentage correct), as a function of expertise 
and metacognitive knowledge. Data from "Die Entwicklung von Gedäch-
tnis-und Metagedächtnisleistungen in Abnägigkeit von Bereich sspezifis-
chen Vorkenntnissen" by J. Körkel, 1987. Copyright 1987 by J. Körkel. 
Reprinted by permission. 
those for the interaction between the knowledge base and declarative 
metacognitive knowledge. Although the declarative metamemory 
measure assessed general metacognitive knowledge, the measures 
tapping procedural metacognitive knowledge were closely linked to 
the domain of interest. In a performance-prediction task, subjects 
had to predict how many sentences of the soccer story they could 
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correctly remember. The second measure of procedural knowledge 
consisted of "feeling-of-knowing" judgments that were given after 
responding to each item of a cloze test. That is, children had to 
indicate how certain they were that they filled in the blanks correctly. 
Results were straightforward in that soccer experts outperformed 
soccer novices on both tasks, regardless of age. 
Taken together, these results indicate that expert knowledge 
strongly affects the quality of procedural metacognitive knowledge, 
and that both expert knowledge and declarative metamemory greatly 
facilitate text recall. One of the most interesting findings from the 
soccer expertise studies concems the fact that metamemory signifi-
cantly contributes to cognitive performance even in those cases where 
the knowledge base is very rich. 
KNOWLEDGE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
STRATEGIES: SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS 2'~{o..55w 
The research reviewed in this chapter makes clear the developmental 
relationship between knowledge and strategy use, particularly in 
memory tasks. Preadolescent children can and do use memory strat-
egies, but only when the task stimuli are highly familiar to them or 
when biased by the experimental context (e.g„ as in sort/recall tasks). 
Older children are also affected by their knowledge of the to-be-
remembered materials, but will behave strategically even with sets of 
atypical or low-associated items, especially if repeated trials are ad-
ministered. Children's content knowledge influences the quality of 
their procedural metacognitive knowledge, with children being more 
apt to show metacognitive competence for highly familiar sets of 
items. The benefits of strategy training are greater and generalization 
is more likely tobe found when highly familiar (e.g., category typical) 
items serve as stimuli. 
Despite our firm beliefs about the relationship between knowledge 
and strategy development, we must temper our conclusions some-
what because of ambiguities in just exactly what we mean by strategies 
and knowledge. We briefly discuss some of these definitional problems 
in the following section. 
Deflnlng Strategles 
In this chapter we have used a traditional definition of strategy, 
stating that it is an effortful, deliberately implemented, goal-directed 
process that is potentially availahle to consciousness (e.g., Flavell, 
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1985; Pressley, Forrest-Pressley, Elliot-Faust, & Miller, 1985). From 
this definition, processes that are activated automatically, that are not 
planful, and that we are not aware of, are not considered to be 
strategic, even if they greatly facilitate task performance. 
The most notable advantage of this definition is that it limits the 
range of cognitive operations to which the term can be applied. When 
strategy includes all processes involved in the execution of some task, it 
becomes a generic term, no different from any one of a number of 
synonyms for thought (e.g., cognitive operation, mental processing). 
By restricting the definition of strategy as we have, other processes 
that are not strategic can be studied, unencumbered by the con-
notations of an overused label. 
This does not imply, however, that strategies should be viewed as 
being independent of nonstrategic processes. Our view of strategies 
makes it clear that they are intricately related to nonstrategic pro-
cesses. The selection and execution of a strategy involves many 
nonstrategic operations, and understanding these nonstrategic com-
ponents is necessary if we are to understand the nature and develop-
ment of the strategy itself. 
Furthermore, there must be the recognition that strategies exist on 
a continuum in terms of complexity, effectiveness, and the amount of 
mental effort required for their execution. When we state that few 
preadolescent children spontaneously use memory strategies such as 
organization or rehearsal, it is not tantamount to saying that these 
children are incapable of strategy use. Rather than simply labeling 
children as strategic or nonstrategic, it is instead much more fruitful to 
determine the type and nature of strategies used by children of a 
given age and how those strategies develop into more effective op-
erations. 
Our definition is not without its own problems, however. The 
requirement that strategies be potentially available to consciousness 
biases one to notice them more in older children and adults than in 
younger children. Consciousness itself is a sticky problem, and insist-
ing that children of any age (but especially young ones) prove that 
they are aware of what they are doing before declaring them strategic 
is a serious shortcoming of our definition. Equally problematic is the 
fact that many adults are rarely at a loss to explain their cognitions, 
sometimes inventing reasons for unconsciously motivated behavior 
(e.g., Gazzaniga, 1985), potentially causing us to overestimate their 
strategicness. 
We do not offer a solution for this definitional conundrum here. 
We do think it is important, however, to maintain a definition of 
strategy that makes it distinct from other terms describing cognitive 
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activity. Regardless of how one defines strategy, it is imperative that 
that definition be made explicit, making it clear what the writer 
considers to be strategic and what he or she does not when making 
claims or interpreting research findings. 
Measurlng Knowledge 
Knowledge is an equally problematic concept. Knowledge-base theo-
rists usually specify the general type of knowledge they are concemed 
with (declarative, procedural), but, at least with respect to declarative 
knowledge, often fail to provide a detailed description of the nature 
of the knowledge base. There are exceptions to this trend, such as the 
work by Chi and her colleagues for children's knowledge of dinosaurs 
(Chi, 1985; Chi & Koeske, 1983; Gobbo & Chi, 1986), research deal-
ing with people's knowledge of the procedures of familiar games such 
as chess (e.g., Roth, 1983), and studies focusing on children's knowl-
edge of the small and highly familiar set of their classmates (e.g., 
Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982; Chi, 1985). However, when discussing 
children's knowledge for broader categories, such as words and real-
world events, estimates of what children know is less precise. More-
over, terms such as semantic knowledge, worUi knowledge, and domain-
specific knowledge of ten go undefined, permitting readers to provide 
their own meanings for these terms. 
Norms of children's word knowledge do exist and are used in 
memory and leaming experiments. These include norms of category 
frequency (Posnansky, 1978), word associations (Bjorklund &Jacobs, 
1984; Entwistle, 1966), and category typicality (Bjorklund, Thomp-
son, & Omstein, 1983). However, these norms are based on small 
samples, both of children and words, and although they are useful, 
they do not provide the level of detail we need to make more accurate 
predictions about the developmental relationship between knowledge 
and cognitive processing. 
Despite the recognition of the importance of such descriptive in-
formation, we fear that this paucity of normative data will not soon be 
rectified. Because the main contribution of normative studies is de-
scriptive and not theoretical, they excite few researchers, and, when 
they are done, they rarely find their way into the most prestigious 
journals. Yet it is only with more detailed descriptions of children's 
declarative knowledge that we can develop more sophisticated mod-
els, and we encourage researchers to collect and report normative 
data in their studies examining the role of knowledge on children's 
cognition. 
The need for more precise measures of children's knowledge is not 
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restricted to the important but limited domain of word meanings. If 
knowledge is as potent a mediator of strategy use as we propose, we 
must extend our work beyond list-learning experiments and in-
vestigate real-world topics, such as children's knowledge of history, 
literature, and geography. These and related topics have important 
implications for communication, reading (e.g., Anderson et al., 1984), 
and, more generally, success in a technological society (see Hirsch's, 
1987, discussion of cultural literacy). Recent research investigating 
reading comprehension as a function of intelligence and knowledge 
has provided important steps in the right direction (e.g., Recht & 
Leslie, 1988; Schneider et al., in press; Walker, 1987). However, as 
topics of research interest become broader and more contextually 
relevant, the knowledge base with which we are dealing becomes, 
necessarily, less weil defined. 
Research and theorizing cannot wait until we can describe precisely 
the nature of children's knowledge, particularly considering that much 
of what any particular child knows will be idiosyncratic to that child 
alone. An alternative is to administer knowledge pretests to subjects, and, 
although time consuming, to use them to develop test materials in-
dividually tailored to each specific child's knowledge base (cf. Bjorklund 
& Bemholtz, 1986). Even if such an idiographic approach were to prove 
successf ul and become widespread, we must also continue with research 
that outlines what children at any one age tend to "know," and how this 
knowledge influences other aspects of cognition. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite the definitional problems, the relation between knowledge 
and strategy use seems unambiguous to us. Age-related changes in 
children's content knowledge are integrally related to their tendency 
to use a memory strategy, the quality of their metacognitive knowl-
edge about such strategies, the likelihood that a strategy will enhance 
performance, the success of strategy training, and the transfer of a 
strategy once acquired. Much more needs to be done, however, in 
terms of describing more precisely what children know and extending 
our theorizing to socially important content. Although much of this 
work may be tedious, it will be necessary if we are to attain a clearer 
understanding of the nature of knowledge development and how it 
interacts with other aspects of cognition. 
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